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Introductory Remarks 
Although English has a number of different t ypes of 
adverbial clauses, as is illustrated by such sentences as 
( 1) a. I will leave when you do. 
b. I will go where you go. 
c. I will leave before you do. 
d. I will leave if you do. 
e. I left because you did. 
f. I left although I wasn ' t supposed to. 
condition,ll clauses (see (1d)) have attracted the most attention 
from phi 11::isophers and linguists. I ndaed, both l i ngui st s and 
philosophers have devoted whole conferences to their 
consideration. What is interesting about this from a linguistic 
perspective is that conditional clauses are not all that muc~ 
more interetsting linguistically than are any of the other types. 
The reason for this special interest is surely that conditional 
sentences play a key role in reasoning, at least the sort of 
reasoning that interests philosophers. 
Interestingly, not only have those who have studied 
conditonal sentences usually not discussed them in the context of 
other adverbial clauses, they have focused their •ttention almost 
e xclusively on sentences like (1d> which employ the adverb if. 
Surely, however, conditional sentences in which if is modified b y 
go!~ and ~~~ as in <2> and <3>, are also o+ interest. 
<2> I will leave only if you do. 
<3> I will leave even if you do. 
Moreover, there are totally ignored conditional constructions, 
very close in meaning to those just cited, which, like 
if-clauses, are adverbial in character: 
<4> I will leave in the event that you do. 
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<5> I will leave only in the event that you do. 
(6) I will leave even in the event that you do. 
It is interesting to speculate on why sentences like (4)-(6) have 
been ignored. One possibilit~ is the stylistic preference of 
logicians for the word lf• However, the main reason is surely 
that monomorphemic realizations of a category are typically 
perceived by native sp!akers (including philosophers> as its most 
basic representatives. 
In this paper, I present a syntactic analysis of a wide 
range of conditional sentences, which develops ideas first 
published in Geis (1973). A companion semantics an~ pragmatics 
for this analysis has been provided by Lycan (1984). Since this 
study has been published, I will presume familiarity with it. 
What I propose to do here is provide the syntactic argumentation 
for this analysis, as well as the details of its formalization. 
What one takes to be a conditional sentence will, I think, 
depend on whether or not one takes a syntactic or semantic 
perspective. Viewed semantically, a sentence like (7a) might be 
said to be conditional on the grounds that it 
meaning as (7b), which clearly is conditional. 
has the "same" 
(7) a. Kiss my dog and you'll get fleas . 
b. If you kiss my dog, you'll get fleas. 
On the other hand, (7a) is not conditional in form, so it would 
be perfectly reasonable not to include this sentence in a study 
of conditional §@Qt~D£~§, a~ opposed to conditonal QCQQQat tiQU~· 
Similarly, one might, following Stump (1981), take a sentence 
like <8> to be pertinent to a study of conditionals. 
(8) For you to do that would be nice. 
Certainly, (8) is conditional in meaning. However, again, there 
is little linguistic motivation for including such ct senten ce in 
the analysis of conditional sentences, though obvi ously it is 
relevant to the analysis of conditional QrOQOSi t:tons, i.e. of 
nonlinguistic mental sentences. I say this because (8), unlike 
(1d) and <2>-<6>, is not conditional in form, and it is the 
possession of linguistic form that distinguishes r~al sentences 
from mental sentences Ci. e. propositions>. The fact that a 
sentence might be conditional in meaning does not qualify it for 
membership in the class of sentences containing conditional 
clauses. The reason is that we may look to e ~tralinguistic 
semantic theories for an account of how it is that English has 
several different ways of expressing conditionality. As another 
example of this point, we might note that the fact that a pair of 
sentences like (9a) and C9b) might both express causality does 
not qualify <9a> as relevant to a study of causal clauses. 
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(9) a. John's leaving precipitated Bill's departure. 
b. John left because Bill departed. 
Too few linguists and philosphers seem to recognize that most 
putatively substantive claims about the relationship between 
syntax and semantics have been largely definitional in 
character. The once widely heralded claim (Harman 1972) that 
Deep Structure is Logical F8rm, is, perhaps the best example of 
this, but there are others. To insist that sentences like C7a) 
and (8) must be brought into the picture in the attempt to 
describe the syntax of conditional sentences is, quite simply, to 
beg one of the mo~t important questions of syntax: What is the 
contribution of syntax to the use and understanding of the 
sentences of our languages? The fact that native speakers of 
English "know" that (7a) and (7b) have the same meaning or "know" 
t hat (8) is conditional in meaning, taken alone, is not 
necessarily relevant to a linguistic analysis of conditional 
sentences, for speakers of English know more than Just English. 
They, pregumably, can do some elementary reasoning with 
sentences. 
If it is to be at all general, a linguistic description of 
English conditional sentences will want to account, at the very 
least, for such sentences as (1d) and <2>-<6>, for these 
sentences are all conditional in form. It should perhaps also 
account for how these sentences are related to other adverbial 
c l ause constructions, such as those of <1>, for these are also 
s i milar in structure. To my knowledge, the only comprehensive 
generative account of adverbial clauses in English is in Geis 
( 1970a). However, Heinamaki (1974) and Larson <mss> have worked 
on tempor al c~auses, and B~esnan and Grimshaw (1978> on a similar 
construction. I shall bring each of these studies into the 
picture as they become relevant. In Geis (1970a), conditional 
clauses were sharply distinguished from adverbial clauses 
introduced by when, while, and where and by before, after, until, 
and §iQ£@• Clauses introduced by this latter array of words were 
said to be a species of relative clauses. I argued (Geis 1970a>, 
in particular, that adverbial subordinate clauses introduced by 
the above connectives are derived transformationally from 
underlying syntactic structures in which the clauses introduced 
by these words are explicitly relative in character. According 
to this view, a sentence like (10) was said to be derived from 
the structure underlying (11) by a rule of Antecedent Deletion. 
(10 ) I will leave at the time when you leave. 
( 11 ;1 I wi 11 1eave when you 1eave. 
Conditional clauses, for reasons 
said not to be relative clauses, 
to be identified 
but, instead, to be 
la
a 
ter, were 
species of 
nominal complements. This line was continued in Geis (1973). 
What I shall argue now is that if-clauses like ~bgn-clauses are 
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themselves a species of relative clauses, as is implied b y 
Lycan's semantic9 of conditional~. However, my present analysis, 
unlike the earlier transforma~ional account of adverbial relative 
clauses, can be stated wholly in terms of English surface 
structures. On the analysis to be presented here, which is 
monostratal, I shall argue that a sentenc§ like (12> has 
essentially the same sort of structure as <11 >. 
(12) I will leave if you leave. 
Th• Adverbial Analysis of Conditionals 
The Sentence Operator Version 
In th• Propositional Calculus, a sentence having the form of 
(13) is usually assigned a represent•tion like (14). 
<13) If 91, then S2 
(14) S1 ~ S2 
where (14) is understood to ~e false if S1 is true and S2 is 
false and is otherwise true. According to this analysis, the two 
clauses that maka up a conditional sentence are coordinated 
semantically as they would ba syntactically if if were a "true 
conJunctifB• 11 to borrow a phrase from Jespersen <1961 i 
V.4.344). On this view, sentence (1d) would be given an 
analy•i9 something like (15). 
(1~) s 
1 
CONJ 
I 
if 
Interestingly enough, dwspite th• long tradition associated 
with the standard truth functional analy•i• of if, there is no 
solid syntactic evidence whatever that supports the division of 
canditionf\ sentances into two coordinata sentences, as in this 
analysis. It might be argued that 1f•••,!b~D··· is structurally 
parallel to •i.tb!C•••or ••• and ~gtb···~Qg.... The parallel is, 
however, an illusion. A• pair• like (16) and <17> show, tb~O 
need not occur for a conditional sentence to be grammatical, but 
of coursa, ~ng and 2c are obligatory in compound sentences. 
(16) If you leave, then 1•11 leave. 
(17) If you leave, 1•11 leave. 
One cannot say 
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(18) *Both John left, Bill left. 
(19) *Either John left, Bill left. 
It is if, not then that is the more fundamental constituent of 
conditional sentences. 
Though logicians normally cite conditional sentences in the 
form of <16) or (17>, a syntactician is likely to take a sentence 
like <2C>>, to be the more "natural, 11 for in (20>, the if-clause 
is in "normal" adverbial position. 
(20) I will leave if you leave. 
Note that the two clauses of <20) are the reverse of what they 
are in CL3>, (16) and (17). In the latter sentences the condition 
precedes the consequence, but in (20>, the reverse is true. As 
noted, I take post-verbal conditional clauses to be in ''normal" 
word order for conditional sentences. Talmy (1976) makes the 
universal claim in connection with causal constructions that 
causes are subordinated to effects in the languages of the world, 
as in Cle) and (1f), repeated here as <21> and <22>, 
respectively. 
(21> I left because you did. 
<22> I left although you did. 
This is to say that languages <other than formal languages, of 
course> do not have adverbial clause constructions in which the 
consequerit is subordinated to the antecedent, from which it would 
appear to follow that (20> is more basic than (13), (16), and 
(17). Moreover, not all languages even have the capacity to place 
condii~onal clauses in sentence-initial position, as in (16) and 
(17). 
The fact that a sentence like (20> might be more natural 
than (13), (16>, and (17) does not, by itself, upend the binary 
sentence operator analysis. One need only define a reverse 
horseshoe?, with appropriately revised truth-conditions, and 
reverse the two clauses. On this revision, the if of (15> would 
cor respond exactly to the reversed horseshoe. However, the fact 
that ti-clauses can occur both sentence-initially and 
post-verbally is itself rather good evidence that if-clauses are 
adverbial. Simple and complex time adverbials both have this 
freedom cf occurrence, for instances 
<23> a. I will leave at noon. 
b. At noon, I will leave. 
<24> a. I'll leave when you leave. 
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b. When you leave, 1>11 leave. 
Data like (23) and (24) strike at the heart of the coordinating 
co~Junction analysis of conditionals, for patterns like these do 
not obtain in the case of coordinate structures: 
(25) a. Joa will leave and Mary will stay. 
b. *And Mary will stay, Joe will leave. 
(26) a. Joe will leave but Mary will stay. 
b. *But Mary will stay, Joe will leave. 
We have quite clear evidence that 1f-clauses are adverbial and 
are subordinate to main clauses, not coordinated with them. 
There is solid syntactico-semantic evidence that post-verbal 
occurrences of tf-clauses (see (20>) are more basic than preposed 
lf-clauses <see <16) and (17)). Observe i~at senten<:es (27)-(29) 
have essentially the same interpretation. 
(27) I think that I will leave if you leave. 
(28> I think that if you leave, (then> I"ll leave. 
(29) I.f you leave, (then> I think I'll leave. 
It is clear that (29) is not to be interpreted as stating that 
there is a conditcnal relationship between the hearer's leaving 
and the speaker's thinking about leaving, contra its surface 
form. Instead, the speaker is saying that he thinks that the 
hearer's leaving will lead ~o his leaving. In the standard 
trans.formational idiom, we would account for this by saying that 
the 1f-clause of (29) is put there by an extraction rule, namely 
Adverb Preposing (recall (23) and (24>>. Even in monostratal 
theories of syntax a sentence like <29> must be treated as the 
"marked" .form. 
Observe that when if-clauses are preposed, as in (28) and 
(29), a second conditional adverbial cannot occur in postverbal 
positionz 
(30) *I think that if you leave, I'll leave in that event. 
(31) *If you leave, then I think I'll leave in that event. 
Thus, we must have some way to exclude a conditional adverbial 
from post-verbal adverbial position, if an if-clause occurs 
clause- or sentence-initially. Within Gf§G, this is achieved, of 
course, via the slash-category notation. 
<32) S ----> ADVC2J S/ADVC2J ($9) 
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Rule (32) stipulates that if an S begins with an adverb phrase 
then the Sit is sister to must have an adverb phrase gap. Given 
rule (32>, we can account for both (30) and <31), as well as <28> 
and (29). 
The adverb preposing data reveals the hopelessness of the 
standard analysis of the structure of conditional sentences in 
logic texts on syntactic grounds, and, as a result of thi~ 
failure, it is hardly surprising that the analysis fails 
semantically as well. Adverbial constructions normally involve 
quantification over something--times, places, events, etc, as is 
implicl; in the relative clause treatment I shall be giving 
later. ' Such a fact is quite telling against the truth 
functional account of if• 
Thee failure of the standard logical treatment of conditonals 
is further revealed by the fact that if-clauses can be modified 
by 90.!.::t and ~Y'.~!J.. Cons;ider: 
(33) a. I wi 11 leave only if you do. 
b. I will leave even if you do. 
(34) a. John works only when his back feels good. 
b. John works even when his back hurts. 
(3:5) a. *John works hard only and Bill works hard. 
b. *John works hard even and· Bill works hard. 
As (34> indicates, 90.l~ and ~~~ are quite comfortable modifying 
adverbial ~n~n-clauses. Note, though, that they do not modify 
nominal ~n~n-clauses: 
(3b) a. He asked me yesterday when I would leave. 
b. *He asked me yesterday only when I would leave. 
We have here the clearest possible evidence that if-clauses of 
the sort we are interested in are adverbial, ff~ note that 
nominal if-clauses aren't modifiable by 2nl~ either: 
(37) a. He asked me yesterday if I would leave. 
b. *He asked me yesterday only if I would leave. 
Certainly the view that if might be a conjunction is falsified by 
(33)-(35). 
Very clear evidence that conditional clauses, when they 
occur postverbally, are constituents of verb phrases and are 
t herefore f~verbials is provided by data involving VP Deletion 
a n d QQ §g. Observe that the place-holders, ~land ~Q ~9 of the 
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following sentences, are interpreted as referring back to the 
underlined verb phrases of these sentences: 
(38) a. I will !@~Y@ !!t [lQQ!J and Joe will <:> tClO. 
b. I will !.~!Y~ !:t Q92!J and Joe will do SC) too. 
C39) a. I will l!~Y~ !:!!:H!!!: £!!:t!!in c i rcumstancE?S and 
Joe will <...,, too • 
b. I will leave under £@~t~in circumstances and 
Joe will do so too. 
<40) a. I will !.@~Y! ~b@n }!!2!:! Q.Q and Joe wil 1 <> too. 
b. I will l@~Y@ ~n@n ~Q!:! gg and Joe will do so too. 
(41 > a. I will !@~Y@ i.f }!2!:! gg and Joe will <> too. 
b. I will l!!!Y! i.f ~Q!:! gg and Joe will do so too. 
The most conservative interpretation of ~hese data is that the 
place-holders in these sentences refer back to constituents, and 
thus that temporal and conditonal constituents of the left 
conjuncts of these sentences are constituents of verb phrases. 
Given this and the fact that these constituents are not noun 
phrases, all that is left for them to be is adverbials <= 
prepositional phrases, adverb clauses, or adverbs.> 
The data we have considered so far involving preposed 
conditional clauses, modification by 2nl~ and §~@n and verb 
phrase ellipsis phenomena provides very strong evidence against 
the view that the conditional and main clauses of conditional 
sentences are coordinate and for the view that conditonal phrases 
and clauses, like temporal phrases and clauses, are adverbial 
constructions. These arguments carry over to the other types of 
conditional clauses identified earlier. Thus, if-clauses 
modified by gnl~ and ~Y~n prepose as do complex prepositional 
phrases like in tb~ event that S, whether or not they are 
modified by 2-nl~ and ~Y@O• VF'-Deletion and QQ .a.Q tests show that 
all of these constructions are or can be con~tituents of 
predicates. 
There also exists quite direct evidence that conditonal 
clauses are adverbial in character, evidence that c:losely links 
if-clauses to iO the event that S constructions on the one hand 
and to adverbial relative clauses on the other. Consider the 
following pronominalization data: 
(42) a. I will leave if ~QY l~~y~, and Joe will leave 
tb~n too. 
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b. I will leave if ~QY l~~y~, and Joe will 
leave in that event too. 
(43) a. I will leave ~b~D ~gy l~~y~, and Joe will 
leave tb~D too. 
b. I will leave ~b~n ~QY l~2 y~, and Joe will 
leave at that time too. 
In these sentences, 
adverbials, either 
we have clauses whose anaphoric reflexes 
simple conditional and temporal adverbs 
are 
or 
more complex prepositional phrases. In this respect, if-clauses 
and ~b~n-clauses act like explicit prepositonal phrases. Compare 
(44 ) and <45> with (42> and (43>. respectively. 
<44) a. 
will leave t.h@U too. 
Joe will leave in that event too. 
<45> a. I will leave ~t. t.n@ t.!.m@ t.h€!t. ~Q!,! !.@~':!§ and 
Joe will leave t.ngo. too. 
b. I will leave ~t. t.n@ t.im@ t.h!!t. '.:(Q!,! !.!!~~~ and 
Joe will leave !!t th~t. t.i.m@ too. 
We would not want to conclude from these data that i.f-clauses and 
~!:l!i!n-claust!s modify explicit prepositonal phrases in underlying 
structure, as I once did in the fabulous days of Generative 
Semantics, but we are entitled ~o conclude from these data that 
if-clauses and ~b~n-clauses are adverbials. 
There is an adverbial analysis of if-clauses that has a good 
deal of initial plausibility, namely one in which if is treated 
as a kind of sentence operator that turns ordinary clauses into 
adverbial clauses. On this view~ lf would be treated as in 
(46) ADVC2J -----> AOVC+cond, +operl S 
According to this analysis, the structure of nonpreposed 
conditionals would look something like this: 
----------
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(47) S 
,c21 ~
N V VC2J 
I I / ------r wi 11 V ADVC2J 
I ~'-
1 eave AfVC2l A 
if ~
you leave 
This analysis is appears to be consistent with at least some of 
the facts we have so far considered, and it provides a not at all 
implausible surface structure. However, there are troubling 
facts, not the least of which is the fact that tbgn pops up 
cases of preposed adverbials. Given the assumptions of (47), 
would want, I think, to say that a sentence like (48> has 
structure like (49). 
in 
we 
a 
(48) If you leave, then I will leave? 
(49) S 
S/ADVC2J---39~ 
ADVC2J S A~S 
ilf then6 6.I 
you leave I w1 l leave 
Though structure <49) is eminently reasonable, I believe that it 
is incorrect. There are two features of (49) that are somewhat 
problematic. There is nothing <explicit or implicit> in such an 
analysis that explains why tbgo might pop up in cond i tional 
sentences. So it is potentially deficient on explanatory 
grounds. Moreover, there is evidence that 1f is a constituent of 
the clauses it introduces, contra (49). 
The Relative Clause Analysis 
The hypothesis that conditional clauses are adverbial in 
character is well-motivated, and the structures we have assigned 
to normal and preposed if-clauses are credible repretsentations of 
the surface organization of such sentences. What iB missing is a 
defense of the particulars of these analyses and some sort of 
explanation of the position of such structures in the grammar of 
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the language as a whole. 
Throughout our discussion of if-clauses, we have found that 
if-clauses and ~b~o-clauses parallel each other exactly: both 
prepose; both accept the modifiers QOl~ and ~y~o; both are 
consituents of verb phrases when they occur postverbally; and 
bot h pronominalize the same way, to the point of sharing the 
homophonous adverbial proadverb ~b~O· This latter point is worth 
pursuing further. There are hosts of languages that employ 
temporal expressions exclusively to express conditionality. Even 
English, which has a plenitude of conditional expressions, allows 
its speakers to express conditionality using temporal 
expressions. The sentence 
(50) When exposed to the air, many substances 
oxidize. 
is used primarily to express a conditional, not a temporal 
relationship, though, of course, it is consistent with a temporal 
interpretation. The reason that temporal expressions can be used 
to express conditional relationships is that the most important 
individuating characteristic of events, the entities quantified 
over in conditional sentences according to Lycan and me, is the 
date of those events. 
The parallel between if-clauses and ~b~o-clauses is a very 
deep one. As Chomsky (1957) noted years ago, if two strings of 
consituents conjoin they are normally not only syntactic 
constituents, but are also constituents of the same type. 
Consider: 
(51> *John was awakened by John and by accident. 
(52> *John knows that I ate an orange and what I know. 
If Chomsky is correct, as the preponderance of evidence over the 
years would suggest, then we must assume that lf-clauses and 
~bgn-clauses are 1§onstituents of the same type and that lf and ~b~n are as well. 
(53) I will consider leaving if I'm asked to and when 
I'm asked to. 
(54) I will consider leaving if and when I'm asked to do 
so. 
Greg Stump has suggested to me that if and when may be an 
idiom, and thus that data such as these may mean very little. 
Against this, I would say five things. First, conJunctions of 
if-clauses and ~b~o-clauses are not themselves idioms, which is 
important since sentences containing if and when merely carry the 
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conjuction reduction a bit further. Second, if ~DQ ~b~D and ~b~D 
!02 if both occur, which is to say that the structure isn't 
frozen. Third, conjunction facts such as these extend to other 
not dissimilar phenomena (e.g. ~b@Q ~Qg ~b@~@ Q1Q b@ tg~yg?) 
which are surely not idioms. Fourth, th meaning of ti !QQ ~b~n 
is compositional, which is uncharacteristic of idioms, which is 
to say that each word makes a contribution to the meaning of the 
phrase and to the sentence as a whole. Fifth, other temporal and 
conditional adverbs conjoin. Note, for instance, that 
ynt1l~clfijses and Ynl~~~-clauses conjoin and Ynt1l and Ynl@~~ 
conjoin. 
(55> I won't leave unless you leave and until you leave. 
(56) I won ' t leave unless and until you leave. 
There is clearly much too much that is s~stematic about these 
conjunction facts to support Stump's suggestion that we are 
dealing with idioms. 
In light of the above, it is tempting to suggest that 
adverbial tf-clauses, like adverbial ~b@n-clauses, are instances 
of the same construction and that ti is in the same lexical class 
with ~bgo. In Geis (1970a>, I argued that adverbial ~hen-clauses 
are a spec~8• of relative clauses, and that ~b~n is a relative 
proadverb. This argumentation is accepted by Lar•on <mss>, who, 
working in a transform,\ional framework, provides a somewhat 
different formalization. 
Of the various ob•ervations in GeiB (1970a), the most 
important were that ~b~n-claus • can be structurally ambiguous, 
that ~bgo-clases are islands, and that ~b@O is a constituent of 
the clauses it introduces. As we shall see, if-clauses and 
~b•a-clauses are similar, but not identical, in regard to these 
three properties. 
Let me b•gin with the worst fact. Compare <57) and (58>. 
<37) I will leave when you say you'll go. 
(~8) I will leave at the time when you say you"ll go. 
Sentences <S7> and (58) are ambiguous between a reading in which 
the speaker promises to leave wh n the hearer performs a speech 
act and one in which the speaker promises to time his departure 
with that of the hearer. In order to account for this 
syntactically, we must suppoae that (57> and (S8> are assigned 
two syntactic analyses which, in one way or another, say that 
~b~Q part22ipatas in two dependency relationships in these 
sentences. Lar&on <mss> takes the transformational line of Geis 
<1970a) and claim$ that ~b~Q is extracted from the main clause of 
~2Y ~~ ~g~'ll l_AY@ on one derivation and from the subordinate 
clause on the other. I shall take the monostratal line of GPSG 
and say that ~b@n-clauses are special cases of the construction 
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type 
(59) S --------> o: 5/o: ($6) 
On this view <57> has a structure like (60) on one interpretation 
and (61) on the other. 
(60) s 
~
N(2J V(2J 
L V~2)
I \ 
I will V ADV(2J 
\ I 
leave SCbarl 
~
ADV(2J S/ADVC2l 
I ~
ADV NC2l V(2lI l ~-
when N V s ADVC2J/ADVt2J
l l ~ I 
you say N(2l Vt2J e 
N
/ 
V
/ 
l l 
you'll leave 
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(bl) s 
N~C2l 
r ~
N V VC2J 
I I ~
I will V AOVt2J 
I I 
leave SCbarl 
~
AOVC2J ~l 
ADV Nt2J ~vc~ 
wh!n N V S/A0Vt2l
yL sly Nt<i ~l/ADVt2l 
I 
N V AOVC2l/AOVt2l 
I I I 
you'll leave e 
Contra the claim that (if)-clauses are structurally similar to 
~h~a-clauses, that is that if-clauses !r• a species of relative2clause, lf-clauses are not ambiguous. Consider (62> and (63): 
(bl) I will leave if you say you'll leave. 
(62) I will leave in any circumstance in which you say 
you • l l l eave. 
Although (62) is a bit long, and complex24 I believe that it is ambiguous in just the way 'that (58) is. But (61) is not 
ambiguous in the way that <57) is. Despite the otherwise 
overwhalming evidence supporting the thesis that if-clauses and 
~b~n-clauses are grammatical sibilings this failure of the 
relative clause analy5is cannot be disregarded. However, it is 
possible to attach too much significance to the nonambiguity of 
conditional clauses. In Geis <1970a>, I presented evidence that 
~bil9-clauses are themselves covert relative clauses despite the 
fact that they also are not ambiguous. Sentence (63) does not 
seem to ~8ve a reading in which ~Utl! links the two occurrences 
of !1!:!2:'.r:'.• 
<63> I studied while Mary believed I should be studying. 
However, I find sentence (64) to be quite acceptable, from which 
it follows that extraction is to some <albeit small) degree 
possible. 
(64) I studied while I was supposed to. 
What we are dealing with here is degrees of extractability. 
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Though most theoreticians resolutely ignore such messy phenomena, 
they exist and may say more about the nature?gf language than do 
neater, theoretically more compliant facts.- Moreover, there 
exists overwhelming semantic evidence <see Geis 1973 and Lycan 
1984) that conditional clauses make covert reference to events, 
which is to say that sentences like (65i and (66) have 
essentially the same interpretations. 
(65) I wi 11 leave if you leave. 
(66) I will leave in any circumstance in which you leave. 
The most natural syntax for a construction that connects clauses 
semantically via quantification over events is to say that the 
clauses are connected syntactically in the way relativization 
connects clauses. Moreover, not only are if-clauses unambiguous 
in the desired way, but so also are clauses appended to in ~ ~
event that, which also need an analysis. Compare (67> with (61) 
and (62). 
(67) I will leave in the event that you say 
you'll leave. 
In previous work (Geis 1973), I related a sentence like (61) 
to (67>, largely because neither is ambiguous and assumed that 
clauses subordinated to in the event that are like <nonrelative> 
clauses subordinated to tb~ !~st tb~t, i. e. are noun 
complements. However, I do not believe that it is possible to 
give a coherent semantics for constructions like (67) given this 
sort of syntactic analysis. I would argue that one should adopt 
Lycan's semantics for (67>, no less than (61>, i. e. take the 
line that clauses embedded as adjuncts to in the event that are 
themselves relative clauses. But if this is the right move, then 
the failure of if-clauses to mirror ~b~n-clauses in regard to the 
question of ambiguity is not fatal. Nevertheless, it must be 
dealt with, of course, as I shall do shortly. 
The second fact supporting the thesis that ~n~n-clauses are 
relative clauses is that elements cannot be extracted out of 
~b~n-clauses. Consider 
(68> a. *Who did the boy leave town when Mary kissed<>. 
b. *Who did the boy leave town at the time when 
Mary kissed<>. 
At present, there are a number of ways this sort of fact can be 
accounted for. I derived sentences like (68a) from sentences 
like (68b) in Geis (1970a) and appealed to Ross• (1967) Complex 
Noun Phrase Constraint to account for (68a). Though not accepting 
the deletion analysis, Larson <mss) gives the more recent analog 
of my treatment by appealing to Chomsky's (1973) Subjacency 
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Constraint. Within GPSG (see Gazdar (1982> for details>, one 
would normally invoke the principle that no constituent can be 
assigned two slashed categories, as would be required for (68a), 
one for ~bg and another for ~b~O· Not surprisingly, nothing can 
be extracted from if-clauses, as can be seen from 
(69) *Who will the boy kiss Mary if Joe kisses<>. 
In order to account for this, conditional sentences must be 
assigned a structure like (70> in order to invoke the condition 
ruling out dual slashes. 
(70) S
/-----
NC2] 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ADVC2J,. 
However, as we shall shortly see, this option is not available to 
us. 
The third argument in favor of the relative clause treatment 
of ~n•n-clauses is that ~n~n is a constituent of the clause it 
introduces, after the manner of a relative proadverb. Compare 
(71 > and <72>. 
(71> I will work until Joe leaves and Harry will work 
until than/that too. 
(72> *I will leave when Joe leaves and Harry will 
leave when then/that too. 
Manifestly (see Geis 1970a for details) the correct treatment of 
(71> and (72> is to say that ~b~Q, but not YQtli, is a consituent 
of th• clauses it introduc•s, as in trees (60) and <61). On the 
other hand, the left conjunct of a sentence like (71> should be 
assigned a structure like (73). 
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(73) r---_ 
NC2) VC2J 
I /-----N v VC2] 
I I ----"-. 
I will V ADVC2) 
I ~
work ADV ADVC2J/ADVC2J
I I 
until SCbar, rel(free)J/ADVC2) 
~~
NC2J VC2l/ADVC2J 
I -----"-.N V ADVC2J/ADVC2l 
Jle le!ves J> 
Clearly, !f functions Just like ~b~n, for (74) is ungrammatical 
on the intended interpretation. 
<74> *I will leave if Joe leaves and Harry will leave 
if then/that too. 
This fact, considered in the light of the fact that tbgn can 
replace !£-constructions as a whole, represents compelling 
evidence that !f is a constituent of the clauses it introduces. 
which is to say that it is a relative proadverb. Given that 
~ni~!~ conjoins with ~ntli, I believe that we would want to 
assign a tree like <73> to sentences containing ~ ~~~ where 
~ni~§! occurs in place of ~ntli• 
As we have seen, two of the three arguments for the relative 
clause treatment of ~b!n-clauses carry over to if-clauses. 
However, the most compelling argument derives from the fact that 
tn~n can occur in initial position in the <grammatically> main 
clause of a conditional sentence if there is a 5entence-initial 
!f-clause. This is, I submit, a fact of over-riding syntactic 
importance, and when properly interpreted provides an explanation 
for the nonambiguity of conditional clauses. In my speech, this 
is a virtually unprecedented construction, but it is quite like 
the corelative construction that has largely departed the 
language. I find the following sentences to be increasingly 
grammatical as one moves down the list. 
(75) a. ***Who steals my purse, him I won't like. 
b. **Where he goes, there I ' ll go. 
c . *When he leaves, then I'll leave. 
ct. If he leaves, then I'll leave. 
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Now consider (76). 
<76) a. **Who steals my purse, I won't like. 
b. *Where he goes, I'll go. 
c. When he leaves, I'll leave. 
d. If he leaves, I'll leave. 
I suggest that the correlative construction is going out of the 
language, with (7Sd) being its remaining trace. 
I would argue that senten~,s like <75c) and (75d) have the 
following syntactic structure: 
(77) s 
ADVC2J 
I 
S/ADVC2J 
A
SCbar) 
DV~ 
ADV~OVC2J 
t~en 66ifJwhen 
Quite surprisingly, correlative ~b~n-clauses, unlike conventional 
Ci. e. post-verbal> adverbial ~b~n-clau5es, ar~ unambiguous. 
Although correlatives are not fully acceptable to me, I feel 
reasonably confident in the . Judgement that the ~bga-clauses of 
<78) and (79), unlike that of (80>, are un~mbiguou5. 
<78> ?When you say you'll phone, then I'll leave. 
(79> When you say you'll phone, I'll leave. 
<SO> I"ll leave when you say you'll phone. 
Perhaps more persuasive will be (81)-(83), which demonstrate that 
there is no extraction reading for preposed ~t!tm-clauses of 
either sort. 
(81) *When you said you'll phone, then I'll l eave. 
(82) *When you said you'll phone, I'll leave. 
(83) I'll leave when you said you'll phone. 
Thus, if we associate conditional sentences with sentences 
containing correlative clauses, the relative clause analysis of 
conditional sentences escapes unscathed from my nemesis 
-148-
counterexample. 
Then nonambiguity of coorelative then-clauses is accounted 
for by the above analysis. Note that the S which is immediately 
dominated by the StbarJ of <77> is not slashed, which can be 
exploited by the semantics to force a "highest" clause analysis 
of modification by ~Q~Q and i_f. Neither can 11 reach" more deeply 
into this S than to the highest verb. I propose that preposed 
~b~n-clauses and if-clauses such as those in <76c> and <76d> that 
occur with main clauses not preceded by tb~D will also occur in 
structures like (84>. 
(84) 
ADVC2J S/ADVC:2J 
-~ 
6 6ADV['.2] S ifLi,en 
In my view, the tb~D that fronts main clauses when 
if-clauses are preposed, is the same word that occurs in 
discourses such as the following: 
(85) A: I'll leave at noon. 
B: Then I'll leave at three. 
An interesting consequence of this is, since tn~n clearly has an 
interpretation in (85>, is that it should also contribute to the 
meaning of a sentence like (75d). Interestingly, just as my 
analysis predicts, Davis (mss> has pointed out that pairs like 
(86> and (87) do not have the same interpretation. 
(86) If you open the refrigerator, it won't explode. 
(87) If you open the refrigerator, then it won't explode. 
As Davis notes, (86) is true of ordinary refrigerators, while 
(87) is true only of refrigerators rigged to explode unless 
opened. I see this as especially strong evidence of the semantic 
benefits of the present syntactic analysis. 
Conclusion 
I have provided quite a number of arguments in support of an 
adverbial analysis of conditional clauses in general and of an 
adverbial relative clause analysis in particular. In a sense, 
this comes down to arguing that li is a constituent of the 
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clauses it introduces. On the other hand~ ~nl~§~ is treated as 
constituent of main clauses, like its morphologically similar 
temporal cousin YDti!• These may seem to be rather small potatoes 
to those not versed in monostratal syntax~ but this is an 
impression worth correcting. Whatever one's theory of syntax, 
one must get the surface structures of sentences right to get 
much of anything else right. Even transformational theories are 
houses of cards built on surface structure piles even though they 
may seem to be grander. 
Perhaps the most important feature of the present analysis 
is that it brings conditional clauses into line with other types 
of adverbial clauses. In this connection, I should, perhaps, 
point out that ~lthgyga-clauses, which I have never had much to 
say about, fall out rather nicely in terms of this analysis. 
What they are is simply the factive counterpart of if-c l auses, 
which are modified by ~Y@Q• I propose to assign the·m essentially 
the same analysis as YQl~~~-clauses get. Lycan•s semant i cs can 
easily be expanded to include them. Just how Q~S~Y~~-clauses fit 
into the program is not as clear, though it would be surprising 
if they were not also to involve quantification over events. 
This work was once regarded as quite abstract, for it 
involved postulating antecedents for adverbial rela1tive clauses 
introduced by ~ ~~ ~nti~, and ~n@c@ and antecedents and relative 
adverbs for clauses introduced by before, after, unti l , and 
~in~~. Interestingly, the most essential syntactic features of 
this analysis are accomodated quite easily within the monostratal 
framework, GPSG, resulting in a description which is no less 
insightful syntactically than the transformational treatment. As 
a result, I believe the analysis must be all the more persuasive, 
since it is syntactically more conservative. 
1. Interestingly, traditional grammarians, who do not seem to 
have been much influenced by logicians, did not single out 
conditional clauses as being of radically greater importance than 
other types of adverb clauses. 
2. This preference of logicians, who are linguistically naive in 
their own way, is itself of interest, as is the fact that they 
virtually always cite conditional sentences with the if-clause 
preposed. See the example sentences cited in Harper, Stalnaker, 
and Pearce (1991) for confirmation of these points. 
3. See Clark and Clark (1977) for an interesting discussion of 
this point. 
4. Though our research is done quite separately, Lycan and I are 
collaborating on the development of a general theory of 
conditional sentences. This effort emerged out of a course Lycan 
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and I once jointly taught at The Ohio State University. We were 
examining Geis (1973), a paper in which I provided a syntactic 
analysis of sentences like (1d) and (2)-(6) and argued for the 
view that a correct semantic analysis of conditional sentences 
must employ quantification over events or circumstances, a 
semantical point of view that has come to be quite fashionable 
(Barwise and Perry 1983>. This semantic analysis led Lycan to 
give the essentials of his very much more sophisticated semantic 
treatment, which in turn inspired me to redo significantly my 
syntactic treatment. 
5. The reason I say this equation is question begging is that it 
was believed correct at that time to use semantic evidence (e.g. 
coocurrence data> in determining the Deep Structure of a 
sentence. Obviously~ use of semantic data in the study of Deep 
Structures of sentences will have as an inevitable result that 
Deep Structures be Logical Forms. 
6. I am not recanting the views expressed in Geis (1984) and Fox 
and Geis (1984) about the limitations of people's logical 
capacities. But the view that people do not control the 
validity-invalidity distinction does not require us to believe 
that people are not able to recognize <at least roughly) some 
synonymy relationships. 
7. Bresnan and Grimshaw (1978) made no reference to Geis (1970a), 
which is perhaps due to the fact that MIT disertations are hard 
to come by even for those who teach at MIT. 
8. I shall show below that the minimalist syntactic theory, 
Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar <GPSG>, proposed originally 
by Gazdar <1981>, and pursued in Gazdar <1982>, Gazdar and Pullum 
<1982>, and other papers provides sufficient descriptive 
apparatus to state this analysis, despite its admirably 
restrictive character. 
9. This analysis, taken as an analysis of the meaning of English
if... ,tb~U···, has very little to recommend it. The connective 
if•••,tb~D··· is, of course, not truth functional. This was 
shown in Geis <1973), is argued by Gazdar (1979) in a more 
general way, and is further argued by Lycan (1984). 
10. Interestingly, Jespersen (1961s V.4.344f>, who recognized 
that many of the so-called ''subordinating conjunctions" (e.g. the 
connectives of (1) above> were morphologically similar to such 
things as relative pronouns and prepositions, called ~i a 
"conjunction proper." Whether or not he meant to be advocating 
that if is therefore grammatically Just like ~ ~ and QC in syntax 
is not clear. 
11. Though I know of no one who has seriously proposed that the 
clauses that make up conditional sentences are coordinate in 
character, it, is nevertheless, not a straw man position. In her 
doctoral thesis, Heinamaki <1974) proposed that the temporal 
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connectives, when, before. and ~D~il, etc. are coordinating
conjuncitons, and this is a great deal less plausible than that 
if is a coordinating conjunction. Her arguments against
Ge{s(1970a) are unimpressive, to say the least. 
12. I am indebted to Arnold Zwicky for this observat i on. 
1"l!'..;J. These very important examples are due to Lakoff ( 1972) • 
14. Reference to "($n)," where "n" is a numeral, is to a rule 
number in the Fragment following the text. 
15. Arguments of a linguistic character (i.e. arguments that are 
not wholly semantic) that conditional adverbials generally and 
if-clauses in particular make covert reference to events are 
given in Geis (1973). The Lycan (1984) paper contains a rather 
more sophisticated version of this analysis, with additional 
motivation. 
16. The analysis I give of the §~Dt~~ of !£-clauses can be 
extended to nominal occurrences of them. See rules ($5) and 
($7). I treat indirect questions as [free] CintJerrogatives (= 
Cint(free>J). The only conditional CcondJ proadverb CproJ that 
can occur in free interrogatives is unmodified if• 
17. These names reflect the transformationalist idiom within 
which they were first discussed. Abandonment of this paradigm 
does not, of course, require that we abandon all of what can be 
learned from data once believed to support it. 
18. Arnold Zwicky has pointed out to me that one can also conjoin 
when and before despite the fact that the former is a relative 
proadverb and the latter is .a preposition: 
(i) I will leave when or before you leave. 
Because of this, I propose to treat prepositions as adverbs. In 
the Fragment additional motivation is given. 
19. I take this as evidence that unless and until are in the same 
lexical class, which is the treatment of the Fragment. 
20. To those who would object to the view that ii is a relative 
proadverb on morphophonological grounds~ I would say two things. 
First, bg~ and ~bg differ phonetically from ~b~t, ~O~Q, ~ ~~~
and ~b~, but this does not stop us from saying that they~ like 
the others, are interrogative pronouns. Second, in hosts of 
languages~ the word used to signal conditionality is homophonous 
with the word used to signal "simultaneity" (and in English, as 
noted above, temporal words are sometimes used to signal 
conditional meanings.) 
21. Larson's work does not include conditional sentences, so I do 
not know what his stand on the issues Just raised would be. 
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22. See Stump ( 1981) for a semantic account of these facts. 
23. When lecturing to an introductory class on English syntax 
taught b y Edward Klima in 1964, I proposed the relative clause 
analysis of conditional sentences, noting this counterexample . I 
decided later that this sufficed to wreck the analysis. It was 
onl y on seeing Lycan•s impressive reformalization of my sketchy 
semantics for conditionals, that I returned to this analysis. 
This semantic treatment clearly wants a relative clause syntax. 
24. Lycan takes a paraphrase like (62) to be especiall y 
perspicuous in regard to the meanings of conditional sentences. 
I agree with him, and we are working toward a book-length 
treatment of conditionals that reconciles his intuitions with the 
s yntactic analysis presented here. 
25. See Stump (1981) and Larson (mss> for alternative 
interpretations of these facts. 
26. As s..,pir (1921> noted, "all grammars leak," and theories must 
be devised in which leaks are intrinsic features of grammatical 
descriptions rather than the embarrassments they usually are. 
27. The slash category on the sister to the mother of then is not 
~ntroduced by the rule tha~ gives us tb•n, but by Adverb 
Preposing ($9), the rule that positions the ~h~o-clause in 
initial position. 
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A Fragment 
In this section, I provide an explicit chracterization of 
the syntax of adverbial clauses generally and conditional clauses 
in particular. In the process, I more fully develop the 
relationship between lf-clauses and other types of conditional 
clauses, as well as other types of adverbial clauses, providing 
in the process a sketch of the motivation for the details of the 
analysis. I assume (a bit loosely) the framework of Gazdar and 
Pullum (1982>, and Gazdar's (1982) treatment of relative clauses 
and of free relatives of the sort Bresnan and Grimshaw <1978) 
were concerned with. 
I. Phrase Structure Rules 
($1) AOVt2J ----> ADV NC2J 
a. at noon, in the garden, etc. 
I am treating prepositions as adverbs because some can stand 
alone as apparent adverbs I naven•t done that before and can be 
thought of as intransitive adverbs. Those that require objects 
can be thought of as transitive adverbs. This approach to 
prepositions goes back to Jespersen (1961 II.1.15). 
($2) NC2J ----> NC2] Stbar, +rel] 
a. the place where Joe lives. <with $6) 
b. at the time at which Joe left. <with ,1 ~ $6 ) 
In Gazdar and Pullum (1982) a given feature is sometimes treated 
as binary and sometimes treated as having other features as 
values. I shall exploit this by taking Crel(free> l to entail 
[+rel]. Though a bit equivocal, this view of features is clearly 
a coherent one. I shall treat Crel(free)J as the marked option 
for trell. So relatives with heads are unmarked r~latives and 
those without heads are marked. 
($3) XC2J ----> AOVC+quantl XC2l 
a. Only John, only on Tuesday, even on Tuesday 
This rule allows for the quantificational adverbs gal~ and ~~~
which I am treating as adverbials that can only modify phrasal 
categories (X[2J). One of the values of C+quantJ is C+negl and 
the other C-negl, features that play a role in triggering 
inversion, as will be shown below. 
(S4) ADVt2] ----> ADV ADVC2J 
a. ~eat the barn, ~nti! then 
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b. only ~o1i! then (with $3) 
This rule allows for eQY~~ei~l obJects for certain prepositions, 
most of which can also occur with noun phrase objects. See Geis 
(1970a, 1970b) for relevant argumentation and the lexicon below 
for lexical details. 
($5) Xt2l ----> Stbar, freel 
COND: t+preJ € XC2J ~ C-slashJ € SCbar, freeJ 
a. I will leave when ~ou leave 
b. I Will go from where ~OU are to ~ ~~ Q@ l~• 
c. John lives near ~b~C@ ~ill !i~~~-
d. This is whKr~ he went. 
f. li ~gy !@~~~, I'll leave. 
h. I wonder 1f n• ~~Qt. 
i. l wonder whether or not QC ~~Qt• 
J• I will leave whether or Qg~ b• ~-Q~. 
Th i s rule allows for clausal noun phrases and adverbial phrases, 
wh i ch are either relative or interrogative in character. I am 
treating embedded free relative• <a-f> and interrogatives <g-J) 
as instances of the class ,of "free" noun phrases and 
int errogatives. As I am using the feature, Cfreel is a value of 
[rel] and of CintJ, the marked value in each case. It is 
tempting to treat <J> as a free interrogative adverbial clause 
because of its similarity to (i). The condition on this rule is 
to insure that preposed free relatives are not slashed, i. e. 
are not ambiguous. 
($6) SCbarJ ----> (AOVC2, +whl> S/ADVC2l 
COND: C+freeJ ~ SCb•rJ ~ C+prol e ADVC2l 
If the mother node has the f•ature C+freeJ, then the daughter 
node ADVC2J has the feature C+proJ, a feature I use to force a 
monolexical pronoun for free relatives. It does not correctly 
get <$5h >1• for ~b!!tb!!C ec oe.t is obviously not monomorphemic, 
though, o f course, ~bgtb@C is. 
a. John lives where Joe is working. <with $5) 
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b. John studied until Joe left. <with $4 8c S5> 
c. John lives at the place where Joe lives. 
<with $1 and $2). 
d. John lives at the place at which Joe lives . 
<with $1 and $2). 
e. I left by the time he arrived. (with Sl and 
$2) 
f. I will leave in any circumstance in which you 
leave. (with $1 and $2) 
As stated this rule gets all sorts of relative clauses, i ncluding 
ordinary relatives with heads <c:, d, e, f) and those without (a, 
b), which have, as "complementizers 11 a monolexic.al pronoun or 
proadverb (a, c>, prepositional phrase (d, f>, or nothing at all 
(b, e). This rule gets only 11 true 11 relative conditional clauses, 
like ($6f>. To get if-clauses or in tb@ @~@Qt tn~t § 
constructions with this rule would incorrectly predict t hat they 
can be ambiguous. See the next rule. 
($7) SCbar, +con~J ----> <ADVC2, +pro)) S 
a. I will leave if you leave. 
b. I will leave unless you leave. <wi t:h $4 and 
$5) 
c. I won 7 t leave unless'f you ask me to. <with 
$4 and $5, Bee also the lexical information on 
k!D1~'1!!> 
d. I will leave in the event that you l eave. 
(with $1 and 
S2> 
This rule gets us conditional clauses. Because the Snode to the 
right of the arrow is not slashed, conditional clauses cannot be 
ambiguous. If the pronoun is C+whJ we get if; if C-whl, we get
tb~t- This distinction is required in order to get in tb~ ~Y@nt
tb~t § conditionals. 
<SB> S/ADVC2, +cond, -whl ----> ADVC2, +pro, -whl S 
COND: C+negJ € ADVC2J ~ C+invJ ~ S 
a. If you leave, then I'll leave. 
b. If you leave, only then will I leave. 
This is is the rule that gets tb~Q into the main clauses of 
sentences with preposed if-clauses, which is the last remaining 
I 
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instance! of the correlative construction most dialects. The rule 
is therefore ad hoc in the desired way, a synchronically 
explanatory theory of lf being a theoretical pipedream. We must 
build into this rule the provision that if th~D is modified by
enl~, its sister S must be marked as undergoing inversion. As 
see it, the COND of this rule is a condition on any rule 
introducing ADVC2J and Sas si~ters, including the next rule. 
($9) S ----> ADVC2, +prel S/ADVC2l 
a. At noon, John left. 
b. If you leave, I'll leave. 
c. Only if you leave will I leave. 
d. ?Only if you leave then will I leave. 
This is adverb preposing, of course. It is subject to the 
condition on the previous rule. If we wish to block <•9d), we 
will need to say that if ADVC2J is t~modl, then S/ADVC2l is 
t-~modl, where Cquantl is a value of [+mod]. The feature C+prel 
<t+prel = •preposed') is there to guarantee that preposed free 
relative•s are not ambiguous--see Rule ($5). 
II. Lexical entries 
A. at, on, in, up, until, •unless= +Rule ($1) 
B. only, even= +Rule ($3) 
C. up, until, unless, although= +Rule ($4) 
D. near, in front of• +Rule ($4) 
COND: C+prepl ICW C+rell j [+adv, +whl € t+rell 
The stipulation--for place prepositions, but not time 
prepositions--is that if n2~c and !n fc2nt gf occur in 
construction with <ICW> a relative clause, the clause must have 
an overt relative proadverb. I use the notion "in construction 
wi th" here for perspicuity, and do not mean to be making the 
c l aim that this notion is required. 
E. until, since, before, after, unless 
COND: C+prepl ICW t+rell J C-whJ ~ C+rell 
The condition--for time and conditional prepositions, but not 
p l ace prepositions--guarantees that relative clauses introduced 
by these words will not have an overt relative proadverb. For 
those who can say I won't leav~ unless'f ~ou ask me to, as I can, 
~ ~~~ is not in this list. I know of no analysis of 
conditionals that can cope at all with this datum. 
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F. if, when, where= [adv(pro(wh))J 
G. then= [advCpro<-wh>>J 
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